Counter Terrorism News CTN Team Member 25/08/2009

Rather than looking at theories about the ‘causes of radicalisation’ (which it deems to be spurious given that it is impossible to determine whether they are instrumental or just present), this report attempts to address the ‘radicalising agents’ that are present across cases of radicalisation (p.3) — a goal that in itself is reasonable and potentially useful. However, many of the means through which this report attempts to achieve this are somewhat doubtful. For the purposes of study, the report chooses to focus on Muslim organisations in the UK and splits them according to ‘non-political religious groups, religious and political groups and non-religious political groups’, whilst admitting that ‘few groups fit neatly into one category and often move between them over time’ (p.3).

From the outset then, the reasons behind the particular framework used are unclear, particularly when the only elaboration given for using them is the difficulties inherent in the framework’s application. In addition to this, Muslim organizations also appear to be the only ‘radicalising agent’ that is developed at all. Despite spending a good proportion of the report analysing terror plots in the UK case by case in order to be able to pinpoint key agents that link them all together (which in itself is a useful and productive task, although necessarily fairly repetitive), it fails to develop the linking factors it then locates: key places, charismatic leadership, relationship links, experiences and stated/assumed grievances.

Instead, the report directs its energies towards an overly brief discussion of the various Muslim organizations in the UK. Its use of primary literature or evidence in support of the proscriptions made is insufficient and, given the brevity of the analysis, it overlooks any of the finer nuances regarding each group. This is evident in some of the inaccurate comments made towards a few of the movements covered — particularly the religious ones:

-     Deobandism, for example, is summed up as advocating ‘a return to traditional interpretations of Islam and is often associated with Tablighi Jamaat’ (p.17), as if that is sufficient. The word ‘traditional’, for example, is assumed to be self-explanatory rather than one that is vague and entwined in the power struggle of religious orthodoxy. The report then declares that ‘Deobandism is now the dominant force in British Islam’ (p.17). This is a bold statement to be made, particularly when it is sourced on the evidence of a Guardian article. The reader may be forgiven for thinking that if Deobandism is described as being associated with Tablighi Jamaat, then perhaps the report delves into greater detail about the ideological/theological outlook of this group. However, this discussion is limited to four words: ‘anti-Western, isolationist and fundamental characteristics’. No further detail is given.

-    Another inaccuracy/ failure to appreciate nuance is the subtitle ‘Salafism’, which has the phrase ‘Saudi-Wahhabism’ bracketed next to it (p.17). Not only is no explanation given, but this is fundamentally wrong; any individual with an interest in this agenda understands that ‘Salafism’ and ‘Wahhabism’ are simply not one and the same thing.

-    The section ends by looking at the Stop the War Coalition. In itself this is— if not an interesting thing to do— then certainly original, but given the brief nature of the report and the minimal space given to other organisations— those that are, it could be argued, somewhat more influential in terms of radicalisation— it seems a little out of place and certainly does not warrant the extensive analysis it receives.

The report concludes with a section on the policy responses of the British Government. If it is an overview, it is not substantial enough (for example it fails to give the funding figures for CONTEST, only for security in general); if it is meant to, as it seems, focus on the ‘two significant changes to government policy’ that have taken place recently, it fails to sufficiently explain the reasons behind its inclusion within this report. Links need to be made between what the body of the report is saying and this final section. In fact, this needs to be done overall as there is not enough of a sense of direction within the report as a whole.

Mention has been made briefly to the inadequate use of sources within this report. It is no exaggeration to say that nearly all of the sources cited are from newspaper reports. Other short-comings include the reliance on a single source (incidentally a report by Z. Bunglawala, whose husband has questionably got extremist sympathies) as the only source for ‘Muslim communities in the UK’ section (p.4). Given the statistical nature of the content, it would have been more appropriate to have cited neutral census information, for example. The use of sources is also uneven. There is a heavy reliance on using sources at some points and not at all at others. For example, they repeat that ‘many theories have been offered about the drivers of radicalization but they are rarely able to prove more than the exception’ (p.3), yet no evidence is provided as to who these theories came from.

Overall, the report remains unclear. Various areas/individuals/groups are elaborated on more than others, yet no explanation is given as to why this is the case. If it is to do with lack of resources, this needs to be clarified. There also needs to be more of an overall linkage, sense of development, and straightforward direction within the report. For example, the report and its conclusion focus predominantly on various Muslim groups within the UK; yet the initial agenda set out to examine a range of ‘radicalizing agents’. If this was deemed too difficult, it needs to be stated and redirected. Due to this, it remains unclear as to who the intended audience is for report. Various areas have detail, but some lack sufficient detail to be relevant, perhaps, to area specialists. Yet the brief overview of Government policy suggests that it is not for Government. This needs to be explicitly set out as well. It doesn’t contain recommendations. Perhaps there are not enough to be made on the basis of what is said. But if that is the case, the report needs to be drawn together in a far more succinct and punchy conclusion, that incorporates the report as a whole and links back to the original intention of assessing ‘radicalizing agents’.